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meetings. The Court recognized that 
the possibility of student peer pressure 
would still remain, however, this pres-
sure presented little risk of official en-
dorsement or coercion because no for-
mal classroom activities were involved 
and school officials could not actively 
participate. [d. 
Finally, applying the Lemon entangle-
ment prong, the Court concluded that 
the school did not risk excessive entan-
glement by complying with the Act. The 
Act prohibited faculty monitors from 
participating in the meetings, as well as 
non-school persons from directing or 
regularly attending the student religious 
meetings. Moreover, school "sponsor-
ship" of religious meetings was pro-
hibited. [d. The Court again relied on 
Widmar, stating that a denial of equal 
access might create greater entangle-
ment problems through invasive moni-
toring to prevent religious speech at 
such meetings. [d. Accordingly, the 
Court held that the Equal Access Act did 
not violate the Establishment Clause. [d. 
Two concurring opinions expressed a 
different establishment premise. Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the incidental 
benefits realized by allowing official 
recognition of a student religiOUS club 
did not lead to an establishment of reli-
gion. He stated that nothing on the face 
of the Act or the Westside facts dem-
onstrated the presence of pressure to 
participate in the religious club. [d. at 
2376-77 (Kennedy,]., concurring). Jus-
tice Marshall offered a more cautious 
opinion, stating that the school must 
"fully disassociate" itself from the club's 
religious speech, activities, and goals. In 
his view, the school must also avoid the 
appearance of sponsoring or endorsing 
the club's goals. [d. at 2378 (Marshall,]., 
concurring). 
The Supreme Court's holding in West-
side will have an immediate impact on 
this country's school systems. Some 
school districts have waited for the West-
side opinion before deciding whether to 
approve similar after-school student 
clubs. Now, student religious groups 
can demand equal access without fear of 
violating the first amendment. 
- Scot D. Morrell 
Hodgson fJ. Minnesota: STATE 
ABORTION LAW REQUIRING 
TWO-PARENT NOTIFICATION 
PRIOR TO A MINOR'S OBTAIN-
ING AN ABORTION IS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL IF A JUDICIAL 
BYPASS PROCEDURE IS 
PROVIDED 
In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 
2926 ( 1990), the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
Minnesota statute requiring that a preg-
nant minor notify both of her parents 
before having an abortion. Although the 
Court found the notification require-
ment itself to be unconstitutional, the 
statute as a whole was saved because it 
provided the alternative of bypassing such 
notice by obtaining judicial approval. 
The Minnesota statute provided that, 
with certain exceptions, an abortion 
could not be performed on a woman 
under 18 years of age until at least 48 
hours after both of her parents were 
notified. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2930. 
This notice was mandatory unless 1) the 
attending physician certified the neces-
sity of an immediate abortion to prevent 
the woman's death, 2) both of her par-
ents had consented to the abortion in 
writing, or 3) the minor declared that 
she was a victim of parental abuse or 
neglect and notice of her declaration . 
was given to the proper authorities. [d. 
The statute provided that if the court 
enjoined the enforcement of the paren-
tal notice requirement, the same require-
ment would be effective unless the 
pregnant woman obtained a court order 
permitting the abortion. [d. To acquire 
such a court order, the minor had to 
convince a judge either that she was 
"mature and capable of giving informed 
consent" to the abortion or that an abor-
tion without notice to both parents 
would be in her best interests. [d. at 
2932-33. 
A group consisting of pregnant minors, 
clinics, doctors, and the mother of a 
pregnant minor challenged the statute 
by filing suit in district court. The group 
alleged that the statute violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses of 
the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 2934. 
The district court found both the two-
parent notification requirement and the 
48-hour waiting period to be invalid, 
and therefore concluded that the statute 
was unconstitutional in its entirety and 
enjoined its enforcement. [d. The 
United States Court of Appeals, sitting 
en banc, reversed. The court determined 
that the two-parent notification re-
quirement was unconstitutional unless, 
as in this case, a judicial bypass proce-
dure was prOvided. [d. at 2935. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed. The Court held that the two-
parent notification requirement was 
not reasonably related to legitimate state 
interests and was therefore unconstitu-
tional, but agreed that the bypass pro-
cedure saved the statute as a whole. [d. 
at 2947. 
The Court began its analysis by rec-
ognizing that the due process clause's 
constitutional protection against unjus-
tified state intrusion into a woman's 
decision whether to bear a child ex-
tended to pregnant minors. [d. (citing 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52 (1976». Since the Minnesota 
statute placed obstacles in the pregnant 
minor's path to an abortion, the state 
had the burden of establishing its consti-
tutionality; to wit, that the obstacles im-
posed were reasonably related to legit-
imate state interests. [d .. 
In considering the constitutionality of 
the notification requirement, the Court 
recognized that similar statutes contain-
ing parental consent or notification re-
quirements had previously been evalu-
ated by the Court and were determined 
to be constitutional. The Court noted, 
however, that none of these cases had 
considered the significance of requiring 
the notification of two parents, rather 
than only one. [d. at 2938. Thus, the 
Court focused its analysis on this dis-
tinction. 
In defending the statute, the state 
relied primarily on the state's interest in 
protecting the independent right of 
parents "to determine and strive for 
what they believe to be best for their 
children," and not on the best interests 
of the minor. [d. at 2946. While the 
Court recognized that such an interest 
may be legitimate, it found that it would 
be fully served by a requirement that the 
minor notify one parent. [d. at 2945. 
The Court determined that in func-
tioning families, where the parents com-
municate with each other, notice to one 
parent would normally constitute notice 
to both and the two-parent notification 
requirement would therefore be unnec-
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essary and would not serve any legiti-
mate state interest. Id. Moreover, in 
"dysfunctional" families, where the par-
ents were divorced or the second parent 
otherwise did not participate in the 
upbringing of the child, the Court found 
that the requirement actually disserved 
the state's interest in protecting and 
assisting the minor. Id The Court noted 
that the record revealed the two-parent 
notification requirement to often result 
in major trauma to the child as well as 
the parent, and to violate the privacy of 
the parent and child even when they 
suffered no other physical or psycholog-
ical harm. Id. The Court wrote: "The 
state has no more interest in requiring 
all family members to talk with one 
another than it has in requiring certain 
ofthem to live together ... [n ]or can any 
state interest in protecting a parent's 
interest in shaping a child's values and 
lifestyle overcome the liberty interests 
of a minor acting with the consent of a 
single parent or court." Id. at 2946. The 
Court found that the separate interest of 
one parent combined with the minor's 
privacy interest outweighs the separate 
interest of the second parent. The Court 
therefore held the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement, standing alone, to be 
unconstitutional.Id. at 2947. 
The Court concluded, however, that 
the bypass procedure provided in the 
statute rendered the entire statute con-
stitutional. Id. The Court noted 
the district court's finding that the by-
pass procedure produced fear and anx-
iety among minors and that, of the 
judges who adjudicated 90% of the 
bypass petitions in 1981, none identi-
fied any positive effects of the law. Id. at 
2940. However, the Court followed prec-
edent set by earlier cases wherein the 
Court determined that statutes requir-
ing parental consent to a minor's abor-
tion would be upheld so long as they 
provided an alternative procedure 
"whereby a minor may demonstrate that 
she is sufficiently mature to make the 
abortion decision herself or that, des-
pite her immaturity, an abortion would 
be in her best interests." Id. at 2948 
(citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n of 
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 
u.s. 467, 491 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 u.s. 622, 643-644 (1979)). 
Turning to the constitutionality of the 
statute's 48-hour waiting period, the 
Court recognized concerns expressed 
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by the district court that such a waiting 
requirement might delay the abortion 
and thereby increase the risk of the 
abortion procedure, but found the wait-
ing period itself to be reasonable and to 
impose a minimal burden on the mother's 
right to decide whether to terminate the 
pregnancy. The Court stated: 
"The brief waiting period provides 
the parent the opportunity to con-
sult with his or her spouse and a 
family physician, and it permits the 
parent to inquire into the compet-
ency of the doctor performing the 
abortion, discuss the religiOUS or 
moral implications of the abortion 
decision, and provide the daugh-
ter needed guidance and counsel 
in evaluating the impact of the 
decision on her future." 
Id. at 2944. 
Through this decision, the Supreme 
Court has authorized states to impose 
upon a minor seeking an abortion the 
additional burden of either notifying 
both of· her parents, regardless of 
whether one is alienated or disinter-
ested, or obtaining the approval of a 
judge who has little or no knowledge of 
her circumstances. In that the Supreme 
Court has approved the mechanism of a 
judicial bypass procedure to render an 
otherwise invalid statute constitutional, 
one may only speculate as to future 
unconstitutional statutory obstacles 
which may be placed in a pregnant 
minor's path so long as similar judicial 
alternatives are prOvided. 
- Rikke Davis 
Maryland v. Craig: MARYLAND 
STATUTE ALLOWING ONE-WAY 
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION 
TESTIMONY OF CHILD ABUSE 
VICTIMS DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
CONFRONT A TION CLAUSE OF 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court 
upheld a Maryland statute providing for 
one-way closed circuit television tes-
timony by an alleged child abuse victim. 
The decision overruled the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, which held that 
the State's showing of the necessity to 
prevent eye-to-eye confrontation was 
insufficient to invoke the statute's pro-
tection. 
Sandra Ann Craig was indicted in 
October, 1986 by a Maryland grand jury 
on various counts of child and sexual 
abuse. Six year old Brooke Etze, the 
named victim in each count had attended 
a preschool and kindergarten center 
owned and operated by Craig. 
Prior to the case proceeding to trial, 
state prosecutors attempted to invoke a 
Maryland statutory procedure that al-
lowed a judge to permit testimony of an 
alleged child abuse victim by one-way 
closed circuit television. Section 9-102 
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article provided that the trial judge 
must first "determin[e] that the testi-
mony by the child victim in the court-
room [WOUld] result in the child suffer-
ing serious emotional distress such that 
the child [could not] reasonably com-
municate." Id. at 3161 n.1 (quoting 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 
§ 9-102(a)( 1 )(ii) (1989)). Once such 
a determination was made, the child 
witness, the state prosecutor, and the 
defense counsel would proceed to a 
separate room while the judge, the jury, 
and the defendant remained in the court-
room. The child witness would then be 
subject to direct examination by the 
state's attorney, cross-examination by 
the defendant's attorney, and any ques-
tions the judge might wish to ask the 
child. The examination would be re-
corded bya video monitor which simul-
taneously displays the witness' testi-
mony in the courtroom. According to 
the procedure, the defendant would 
remain in communication with his at-
torney, but not with the child witness. 
Any objections made by either attorney 
would be ruled on by the judge in the 
courtroom. 
In support of its invocation of the 
statutory procedure, the state's attorney 
offered expert testimony that Brooke, 
testifying in Craig's presence, would 
have suffered the required serious emo-
tional distress such that she could not 
have reasonably communicated. Craig 
objected, arguing that the procedure vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The trial court rejected 
that challenge, stating that while the 
procedure took away the physical con-
frontation between the witness and the 
accuser, the statute preserves the "es-
sence" of the constitutional right. The 
procedure allowed the defendant the 
right to observe, cross-examine, and 
